

Hadivoli

Fine-grained process isolation against hostile OS and libraries using Confidential VMs

Inria



Harena Rakotondratsima¹, Jean-François Dumollard¹, Jana Toljaga¹, Nicolas Derumigny², Gaël Thomas²

1. firstname.lastname@telecom-sudparis.eu 2. firstname.lastname@inria.fr

Virtual Machine (VM)


- **Hardware abstraction layer** technique
- Multiple **isolated systems** on one physical machine
- **Hypervisor**: controls and manages VMs
- **VMs**: guest system executing with dedicated **virtual resources**

Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs)

- VMs run inside **encrypted memory**
- Protects VMs against **external threats**:
 - hypervisor
 - physical attacks (bus snooping)
 - malicious admins

Applications in VMs are exposed to **internal threats**:

- ⚠ **Kernel** requires **full memory access**
 - ⚠ **Untrusted** third-party libraries
- => **Large attack surface**




Challenge

How to prevent internal threats from leaking application data?


Libvolimem: light virtual machine

- **Process virtualization** without a full OS
- **Runtime** with 8K LOC
- **Kernel capabilities** exposed to user space
- Overhead induced by transfers (e.g., syscalls, shared memory) and virtualization



Hadivoli: process virtualization with Intel TDX

- Run the process inside an **Intel TDX-encrypted VM**:
- **Trusted context**: application + libvolimem
- **Untrusted context**: third-party libraries
- **Memory isolation** between contexts
- **Secure channel** communication between contexts
- **Syscall transfer** using **unencrypted shared** buffer
- **Mediates** untrusted context syscalls to prevent data leaks



Out of scope

- Denial-of-service attacks by the host OS or untrusted libraries
- Logical vulnerabilities or bugs inside the trusted application
- Side-channel attacks (cache-timing attacks,)

Expected results

- ✓ **Reduced attack surface**: fewer code paths and potential exploitation vectors
- ✓ **Process level isolation**: protection from external and internal threats
- ✓ **Flexible trust boundary**: the application owner decides which libraries to trust