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Accueil > Équipes > R3S > Séminaires R3S > Séminaires R3S 2015

"Journée sécurité SAMOVAR" - Télécom SudParis

"Journée sécurité SAMOVAR" - Télécom SudParis

Le laboratoire SAMOVAR a le plaisir de vous convier à
la Journée sécurité SAMOVAR - Télécom SudParis
le vendredi 30 octobre 2015, de 10h30 à 15h45

avec la participation exceptionnelle de
Evangelos Kranakis, professeur à Carleton University

Inscription obligatoire à l’adresse suivante http://form.jotformeu.com/form/50832224398356

Programme "Journée sécurité SAMOVAR"

Morning session (10h30-12h00)

Nesrine Kaaniche "Anonymous Credential Systems" (45 mns)
Christophe Kiennert "Game Theoretical Approaches for Network Security Optimization" (45 mns)

Afternoon session (14h00-15h45)

Evangelos Kranakis "Optimization Problems in Infrastructure Security" (1 hr)
Luca De Cicco "Detecting Integrity Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems : A Multi-Watermark Approach" (45 mns)

Evangelos Kranakis (Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada).

Title : Optimization Problems in Infrastructure Security


How do we identify and prioritize risks and make smart choices based on fiscal constraints and limited resources ? The main goal of infrastructure security is to secure, withstand, and rapidly recover from potential threats that may affect critical resources located within a given bounded region. In order to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure, proactive and coordinated efforts are necessary.

Motivated from questions raised by infrastructure security, in this talk we survey several recent optimization problems whose solution has occupied (and continues to occupy) computer science researchers in the last few years. Topics discussed include : (1) Patrolling, (2) Sensor Coverage and Interference, (3) Evacuation, (4) Domain Protection and Blocking.

The central theme in all the problems mentioned above will involve mobility in that the participating agents will be able to move over a specified region with a given speed.

Security in itself is undoubtedly a very broad and complex task which involves all layers of the communication process from physical to network. As such the limited goal of this survey is to outline existing models and ideas and discuss related open problems and future research directions, pertaining to optimization problems in infrastructure security.

Short Bio

Evangelos Kranakis is Chancellor’s Professor at the Computer Science Department of Carleton University. He received a B.Sc. (in Mathematics) from the University of Athens, Greece, in 1973 and a Ph.D. (in Mathematical Logic) from the University of Minnesota, USA, in 1980. From 1980 to 1982, he was at the Mathematics Department of Purdue University, USA, from 1982 to 1983 at the mathematisches institut of the University of Heidelberg, Germany, from 1983 to 1985 at the Computer Science Department of Yale University, USA, from August to December of 1985 at the Computer Science Department of the Universiteit van Amsterdam, and from 1986 to 1991 at the Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica (CWI) in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. He joined the faculty of the School of Computer Science of Carleton University in the Fall of 1991.

He has published in the analysis of algorithms, bioinformatics, communication and data (ad hoc and wireless) networks, computational and combinatorial geometry, distributed computing, and network security. He is the author of Primality and Cryptography (Wiley-Teubner series in Computer Science, 1986), and co-author of Boolean Functions and Computation Models with Peter Clote (Springer Verlag Texts in Theoretical Computer Science, 2002) and Principles of Ad Hoc Networking with Michel Barbeau (Wiley, 2007). His editorial activities include Associate Editor of International Journal of Computer Science & Applications (IJCSA), Editorial Board of Algorithms, Editorial Board of Discrete Mathematics, Algorithms and Applications, Editorial Board of Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science (EPTCS)

He was director of the School of Computer Science from 1994 to 2000. He received the Carleton Research Achievement award in 2000. He has been in the RMC (Research Management Committee) of MITACS (Mathematics of Information Technology and Complex Systems) since 1998. He was IT (Information Technology) Theme Leader from 1998 to 2004 and CNS (Communication, Networks, and Security) Theme Leader from 2004 to 2010 in the MITACS NCE (Networks of Centers of Excellence). He served in the NSERC Grant Selection Committee for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010. He became Carleton University Chancellor’s Professor in 2006.

Nesrine Kaaniche :
"One of the main technical challenge regarding our daily life is how to propose consumers their usual services, while keeping their privacy safe. Cryptography is certainly part of the solution as it already provides some advanced tools going beyond traditional features. This presentation will first survey recent advances in cryptography for users’ accountability and anonymity support. It will then focus on anonymous authentication and ways to build solutions based on complex access control policies."

Luca De Cicco :
"This talk addresses the problem of detecting attacks against cyber-physical systems. Such attacks shall be handled both in terms of safety and security. Networked control technologies imposed by industrial standards already cover the safety dimension through, for instance, failure detection mechanisms. However, less efforts have been deployed to cover the security dimension. In this talk we reexamine the security of a detection scheme proposed by Mo and Sinopoli (2009) and Mo et al. (2015). The approach does not require the use of cryptography but relies on a
watermark signal that is superposed to the controller output for the detection of the attacks. We show that the approach only detects minimum-knowledge adversaries, i.e., attackers with the ability to eavesdrop information from the system, but that do not attempt to get knowledge about the system model itself. However, we show that the detector fails at covering maximum-knowledge adversaries, i.e., attackers that are
also able to infer the system model to evade the detection. We present an enhanced scheme based on a multi-watermark authentication signal. We show, via numerical simulations, that the new approach succeeds at properly detecting the two adversary models."